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Abstract. - Mainstream interpretations of quantum theory maintain that violations of the Bell
inequalities deny at least either realism or Einstein locality. Here we investigate the premises of
the Bell-type inequalities by returning to earlier inequalities presented by Boole and the findings of
Vorob’ev as related to these inequalities. These findings together with a space-time generalization
of Boole’s elements of logic lead us to a completely transparent Einstein local counterexample
from everyday life that violates certain variations of the Bell inequalities. We show that the
counterexample suggests an interpretation of the Born rule as a pre-measure of probability that
can be transformed into a Kolmogorov probability measure by certain Einstein local space-time
characterizations of the involved random variables.
Introduction. – We discuss models of Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm type [1, 2] of experiments as used
by John Bell [3] when presenting his celebrated inequal-
ities. These experiments result in outcomes of two spin-
values ±1 (in units of h¯/2) that in turn depend on cer-
tain magnet settings a,b, c... and have been linked to
two-valued functions Aa(·), Ab(·), Ac(·) = ±1 by Bell and
followers. Here (·) stands for the dependency on some
element of a set of mathematical representations of ele-
ments of reality that do not depend on the magnet settings
a,b, c.... This latter fact of independence from magnet
settings was deduced by Bell from considerations of Ein-
stein locality and the (physically unjustified) assumption
that the elements of reality emanate exclusively from a
distant source and not from the measurement equipment
(including the magnets). There are numerous inequali-
ties, delineated in the physics literature that are related
to Bell’s functions Aa(·), . . .. These inequalities were first
derived by Boole [4] in a much more general context. Here
we discuss mainly a variation of the inequalities as pub-
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lished by Leggett and Garg [5], for which we also have
developed a transparent counterexample. More complex
counterexamples have been developed in the past for the
more elaborate inequalities [6] but have remained largely
unappreciated because of their lack of transparency. Nev-
ertheless, strong movements critical of Bell’s approach
continue to grow as demonstrated by contributions of Ac-
cardi, Fine, Rastal, Khrennikov, Nieuwenhuizen and many
others [7–11]. Here, however, we do not refer to non-
Kolmogorovian approaches [11] and we like to stress that
we also do not invoke detector inefficiencies or anything
related to fair sampling [12]. Instead, our counterexample
is based on a more complete characterization of Boole’s
logical elements.
The Leggett-Garg inequality reads:
Aa(·)Ab(·) +Aa(·)Ac(·) +Ab(·)Ac(·) ≥ −1. (1)
Inserting all possible values of ±1 for the functions A(.)
shows the correctness of this inequality. Because measure-
ment outcomes of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) exper-
iments [13] (that are closely related to such two-valued
functions A(.)) do violate this inequality, it is commonly
concluded that either (·) can not stand for any element
of reality and one must therefore abandon realism or if it
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stands for an element of reality it must depend on the mag-
net settings and thus violate Einstein locality. There are,
however, two important questions that have never been
answered satisfactorily. If (·) stands for an element of re-
ality, why does it have to appear identically for the three
magnet setting pairs? If, on the other hand (·) is just seen
as a random variable, why do the functions A not also
depend on a measurement time label, as they are intro-
duced in the theory of stochastic processes [14]? We give
below a clear answer to these questions by means of our
counterexample but discuss first the different views taken
in the well established probability theories of Boole and
Kolmogorov as well as quantum mechanical “probability”
as introduced by the Born rule.
The probability theory of Boole and its generalization
and perfection by Kolmogorov reduce the actual experi-
ments to logical abstractions and establish a one to one
correspondence between the experiments and these ab-
stractions. For the case that interests us we have only
two possible experimental outcomes denoted by ±1 (or
equivalently 0, 1 or true and false). “Probability” is de-
fined by Boole and Kolmogorov by imposing a measure
(a real number of the interval [0, 1]) onto these elements
that is consistent with the experimental factors related to
both the single logical abstractions as well as the whole
set of these abstractions. This is the hallmark of mod-
ern probability theory and emphasizes the relation to set
theory.
The one to one correspondence of mathematical abstrac-
tions to actual experiments and a measure on the set of
these abstractions are both necessary to give meaning to
the word probability in a set-theoretic sense. The less
familiar reader is encouraged to look at these definitions
in the original work of Boole [4] or, for the Kolmogorov
framework, in textbooks such as [15]. For such a model
to make general sense in all experimental situations, we
must assume that (1) a given and well defined logical ele-
ment representing an experimental outcome or, in the lan-
guage of Kolmogorov, an elementary event will occur with
the same probability measure throughout all experiments
and that (2) the physical characterization of the logical
elements of Boole (elementary events of Kolmogorov) is
consistent and complete throughout the experimental se-
quence.
This requirement for the description of experiments by
mathematical and logical abstractions that represent a
“truth” throughout an experimental sequence, brings us
back to the fundamental statement of Plato’s logic: “P
aut non P tertium non datur” and goes to the heart of
discussions related to questions such as “does the moon
shine when I am not looking?”. The sentence “The moon
shines” is, in general too ill defined to be identified with a
logical variable, sayB that assumes a value +1 if the moon
shines and −1 if it does not. Throughout any reasonably
general experimental sequence that lasts for a certain du-
ration, the moon may or may not shine at certain different
places and B will therefore assume a variety of values at
these different places. Correspondingly a certain outcome
of B can not stand for the same mathematical abstraction
that describes facts at different locations. If we wish to
associate with B a certain truth or logical expression that
is valid everywhere and throughout the experimental se-
quence we need to introduce some generalized coordinates
and formulate a more precise statement such as “the moon
was shining in Monte Carlo at a certain date and time”.
In connection with general science experiments we need to
note that a statement about experimental outcomes often
may make no sense whatsoever without the introduction
of a coordinate system.
Therefore, we propose the use of the space-time of spe-
cial relativity to complete the characterization of Boole’s
logical elements and Kolmogorov’s elementary events. We
assume that only this completion can lead to true-false or
other binary statements that are always and everywhere
valid even in very complex one to one correspondences of
mathematical abstractions with actual experiments.
We can, as a simple example, have a number of coins and
measure the outcome of coin-tosses at certain given space-
time coordinates. The coins may contain some magnetic
material and there may be hidden magnets with settings
a,b, c that co-determine a probability to measure head
or tail for the given coins at the given space-time coordi-
nates. For given magnet settings and space-time coordi-
nates of the coins we have then certain outcomes that form
a sample space and certain probabilities for the outcomes
that together with the sample space form a probability
space [15]. If we do not label the coins by their correct
space-time coordinates then we may have, for example,
different magnet settings applying to the same coin and
therefore may have different probabilities for the outcomes
of the coin toss which may lead to confusion and contra-
dictions.
Quantum theory uses a variation of probability theory
by invoking a wave function ψ that does not have a direct
physical interpretation but does correspond to a certain
experimental procedure of preparation. The settings of
the macroscopic measurement equipment can be chosen
at will and the measurements may be performed involving
detection of particles that involve a space-time description
through the many-body Hamiltonian and wave function
ψ. The “probability” to measure a particle by the given
equipment with given setting is then related by Born’s in-
terpretation to the absolute square (a positive number) of
the wave function that thus assigns a positive number to
an event once the actual type of measurement is chosen.
This assignment, however, can not yet be regarded as a
probability measure in the spirit of Boole or in terms of
Kolmogorov’s definitions because there is no assignment
made at this point for a sample space, i.e. a space of all
possible outcomes and corresponding elementary events
or logical elements. The Born rule appears thus as a pre-
measure that may be expanded to a full Kolmogorov prob-
ability measure only after all experiments of a sequence
are chosen i.e. once all macroscopic equipment configu-
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rations of measurements and all possible outcomes (data)
are fully determined. If we desire to create a Kolmogorov
frame model based on Born’s rule, then the actual choice
of random variables may also necessitate the introduction
of one or more stochastic processes in order to include
time coordinates that are otherwise not included in the
Kolmogorov framework. Even this advanced procedure as
described e.g. in [14] leaves us with the vexing problem of
determination which mathematical abstractions (elemen-
tary events of Kolmogorov or logical elements of Boole)
correspond to the different actual experiments.
For example, assume that one measures correlated pairs
of spin 1/2 particles with magnet settings a,b and char-
acterizes the dichotomic outcomes for the a,b settings by
the variables Aa, Ab. Further assume that in another set
of measurements we measure with magnet settings a, c.
Can we then denote the corresponding variables for the
outcomes by Aa, Ac? Recall that, in this second case, we
measure the “Aa” outcomes corresponding to the c set-
ting (in the other wing of the experiment) at different
space-time coordinates and with different correlated pairs
as compared to the first case “Aa” outcomes that corre-
spond to the original b setting. Is it then permitted to use
the same dichotomic variable or logical element as used for
the b setting?
Because a sample space and single outcomes are not in-
cluded into considerations of quantum theory, this theory
does not answer the above question. The Born rule per
se does therefore not provide probabilities in the sense of
Boole or Kolmogorov but can only lead to a probability
once a one to one assignment of mathematical elements
and experimental outcomes is made and a measure for
the whole space of possible outcomes, the whole sample
space, is introduced. This can not be accomplished by
normalizing a given wave function because that normaliza-
tion refers only to a single preparation and measurement
of a much more elaborate sequence of experiments. How-
ever, it is clear that for measurements with a given macro-
scopic setting and a fixed method of preparation, sample
spaces can always be created and that such a sample space
of measurement outcomes together with the probabilities
from Born’s rule forms then also a probability space a` la
Kolmogorov for a given setting as outlined in texts such
as [14]. Nevertheless, for different and particularly for in-
compatible experiments and for a given characterization
of functions or random variables e.g. by magnet settings
only, such a probability space may not exist.
As we will see in our counterexample this non-existence
depends crucially on the one-to-one correspondence of
the experimental outcomes to their mathematical ideal-
izations be they elements of Boolean logic or elementary
events in the framework of Kolmogorov.
Many mathematical papers on probability theory sim-
ply start with the phrase “given a Kolmogorov probability
space...”. It is, however, well known and has been partic-
ularly well pointed out by Vorob’ev [16] that there are
cases in which a Kolmogorov probability space does not
exist. In particular, there exist numerous classical experi-
ments that subject to certain characterizations by simple
settings, can not be described on one probability space
in a logically consistent way. Take, for example, certain
physical experiments that can be described by Stochastic
Processes. Examples are Brownian motion or stock mar-
ket and exchange rate fluctuations. It is plausible that
such different processes may not be describable by a sin-
gle stochastic process but are described rather by different
ones. It is less known but has been shown in great detail
that even very slight changes in experiments may require
the use of different stochastic processes for their descrip-
tion and that this is true also for EPR-type experiments.
It is the purpose of this paper to show that Born’s rule
defines a pre-probability measure that only then can be
turned into a Kolmogorov (or Boole) probability if a log-
ically consistent one to one correspondence between ex-
perimental outcomes and mathematical abstractions is or
can be made. We also show that such one to one corre-
spondence can always be made for the known EPR exper-
iments by completing the characterization of the math-
ematical symbols describing the functions A of Bell by
use of space-time indices that relativity theory provides
us with. Indices related to influences at a distance would
also accomplish the same goal of obtaining a consistent
probability measure a` la Kolmogorov from Born’s rule but
do not appear to be necessary.
Games with symptoms and patients: From Boole
to Bell. – As mentioned, the early definitions of prob-
ability by Boole were related to a one to one correspon-
dence that Boole established between actual experiments
and idealizations of them through elements of logic with
two possible outcomes. His view gave the concept of prob-
ability precision in its relation to sets of experiments and
this precision is expressed by Boole’s discussion of prob-
abilities as related to possible experience. These discus-
sions can be best explained by an example that also shows
the role of space-time coordinates in the characterization
of variables related to probability theory. We discuss first
this example that has its origins in the works of Boole and
also Vorob’ev and relates to the work of Bell inasmuch as
it can be used as a counterexample to Bell’s conclusions re-
lated to non-locality. Then we return to the more general
discussions of probability in quantum theory.
Consider a certain disease that strikes persons in dif-
ferent ways depending on circumstances such as place of
birth and place of residence etc.. Assume that we deal
with one set of patients that are born in Africa (sub-
script a), in Asia (subscript b) and in Europe (subscript
c). Assume further that doctors are assembling informa-
tion about the disease altogether in the three cities Lille,
Lyon and Paris, all in France. The doctors are careful
and perform the investigations on randomly chosen but
identical dates. The patients are denoted by the sym-
bol Alo(n) where o = a,b, c depending on the birthplace
of the patient, l = 1, 2, 3 depending on where the doc-
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tor gathered information 1 designating Lille, 2 Lyon and
3 Paris respectively, and n = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N denotes just a
given random day of the examination. The doctors assign
a value A = ±1 to each patient; A = +1 if the patients
show a certain symptom and A = −1 if they do not.
The first variation of this investigation of the disease
is performed as follows. The doctor in Lille examines
all patients of type a, the doctor in Lyon all patients of
type b and the doctor in Paris all patients of type c. On
any given day of examination (of precisely one patient for
each doctor and day) they write down their diagnosis and
then, after many exams, concatenate the results and form
the following sum of pair-products of exam outcomes at a
given date described by n:
Γ(n) = A1
a
(n)A2
b
(n) +A1
a
(n)A3
c
(n) +A2
b
(n)A3
c
(n). (2)
Boole noted now that
Γ(n) ≥ −1, (3)
which can be found by inserting all possible values for
the patient outcomes summed in Eq. (2). For the average
(denoted by 〈.〉) over all examinations we have then also:
Γ = 〈Γ(n)〉 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
Γ(n) ≥ −1. (4)
This equation gives conditions for the product averages
and therefore for the frequencies of the concurrence of
certain values of A1a(n), A
2
b
(n) etc. e.g. for A1a(n) =
+1, A2
b
(n) = −1. These latter frequencies must therefore
obey these conditions. Thus we obtain rules or non-trivial
inequalities for the frequencies of concurrence of the pa-
tients symptoms. Boole calls these rules “conditions of
possible experience”. In case of a violation, Boole states
that then the “evidence is contradictory”.
In the opinion of the authors, the term “possible ex-
perience” is somewhat of a misnomer. The experimen-
tal outcomes have been determined from an experimental
procedure in a scientific way and are therefore possible.
What may not be possible is the one to one correspon-
dence of Boole’s logical elements or variables to the ex-
perimental outcomes that the scientist or statistician has
chosen. In order to judge precisely where the contradic-
tions arise from, we need to advance 100 years to the work
of Vorob’ev on the one side and go back to the meaning of
Plato’s logic and his rule “aut P aut non P tertium non
datur” on the other.
Before doing so, however, we note the following. In
this example, we may indeed regard the various Al
o
(n) =
±1 with given indices as the elements of Boole’s logic to
which the actual experiments can be mapped. As shown
by Boole, this is a sufficient condition for the inequality
of Eq. (4) to be valid. We may in this case also omit all
the indices except for those designating the birth place
and still will obtain a valid equation that can never be
violated:
〈AaAb〉+ 〈AaAc〉+ 〈AbAc〉 ≥ −1. (5)
The reason is simply that three arbitrary dichotomic vari-
ables i.e. variables that assume only two values (±1 in
our case) must always fulfill Eq. (5) no matter what their
logical connection to experiments is because we deduce
the three products of Eq. (5) from sequences of each three
measurement outcomes. Note that Eq. (5) contains six
factors with each birthplace appearing twice and repre-
senting then the identical result. Below we will discuss
a slightly modified experiment that is much more general
and contains six measurement results for the six factors.
Before discussing this more general experiment that re-
sembles more clearly EPR experiments we turn now to
the findings of Vorob’ev regarding this type of inequalities
and Boole’s conditions of possible experience.
Obviously the inequality of Eq. (3) is non-trivial because
based on the fact that the value of all products must be
±1 one could only conclude that
Γ(n) ≥ −3. (6)
The nontrivial result has the following reason. Boole in-
cluded into Eq. (2) a cyclicity: the outcomes of the first
two products determine the outcomes in the third prod-
uct. Because all outcomes can only be ±1 the cyclicity
gives rise to Eq. (3). Vorob’ev showed precisely 100 years
after Boole’s original work in a very general way that it
is always a combinatorial-topological cyclicity that gives
rise to non-trivial inequalities for the mathematical ab-
stractions of experimental outcomes. Boole pointed to the
fact that Eq. (3) can not be violated. However, in order
to come to that conclusion, the Alo(n) need, in the first
place, to be in a one to one correspondence to Boole’s
elements of logic that follow the law “aut A = +1 aut
A = −1 tertium non datur”. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, eternally valid statements about physical experience
such as “aut A = +1 aut A = −1 tertium non datur” can
usually not be made when describing the physical world
without the use of some coordinates. In the example above
these coordinates where the places of birth, the places of
examination and the numbering of the exams that were
randomly taken. All these coordinates when added need
to still allow for a cyclicity in order to make Boole’s in-
equality non-trivial. Therefore, if we have a violation of a
non-trivial Boole inequality, then we must conclude that
we have not achieved a one to one correspondence of our
variables to the elementary eternally true logical variables
of Boole and that we need further “coordinates” that will
then remove the cyclicity. In order to illustrate all this by
a simple example, we consider the following second differ-
ent statistical investigation of the same disease.
We now let only two doctors, one in Lille and one in
Lyon perform the examinations. The doctor in Lille ex-
amines randomly all patients of types a and b and the one
in Lyon all of type b and c each one patient at a randomly
chosen date. Note that in this way, all patients of type b
receive two examinations. The doctors are convinced that
neither the date of examination nor the location (Lille or
p-4
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Lyon) has any influence and therefore denote the patients
only by their place of birth. After a lengthy period of
examination they find:
Γ = 〈AaAb〉+ 〈AaAc〉+ 〈AbAc〉 = −3. (7)
They further notice that the single outcomes of Aa, Ab and
Ac are randomly equal to ±1. This latter fact completely
baffles them. How can the single outcomes be entirely
random while the products are not random at all and how
can a Boole inequality be violated hinting that we are not
dealing with a possible experience? After lengthy discus-
sions they conclude that there must be some influence at a
distance going on and the outcomes depend on the exams
in both Lille and Lyon such that a single outcome mani-
fests itself randomly in one city and that the outcome in
the other city is then always of opposite sign. Naturally
that way they have removed the Vorob’ev cyclicity and we
have only the trivial inequality Eq. (6) to obey.
However, there are also other ways that remove the
cyclicity, ways that do not need to take recourse to in-
fluences at a distance. For example we can have a time
dependence and a city dependence of the illness as follows.
On even dates we have Aa = +1 and Ac = −1 in both
cities while Ab = +1 in Lille and Ab = −1 in Lyon. On
odd days all signs are reversed. Obviously for measure-
ments on random dates we have then the outcome that
Aa, Ab and Ac are randomly equal to ±1 while at the
same time Γ(n) = −3 and therefore Γ = −3. We need no
deviation from conventional thinking to arrive at this re-
sult because now, in order to deal with Boole’s elements of
logic, we need to add the coordinates of the cities to obtain
Γ = 〈A1aA
2
b
〉 + 〈A1aA
2
c〉 + 〈A
1
b
A2c〉 ≥ −3 and the inequal-
ity is of the trivial kind because the cyclicity is removed.
The date index does not matter for the products since
both signs are reversed leaving the products unchanged.
However, in actual fact, also this index might have to be
included and could be a reason to remove the cyclicity e.g.
Γ = 〈A1a(d1)A
2
b
(d1)〉+〈A
1
a(d2)A
2
c(d2)〉+〈A
1
b
(d3)A
2
c(d3)〉 ≥
−3, where we now have included the fact that the exams
of pairs are performed at different dates d1, d2, d3.
We note that in connection with EPR experiments and
questions relating to interpretations of quantum theory,
Eqs. (1) and (3) are called Leggett-Garg inequalities and
are of the Bell-type. It is often claimed that a violation
of such inequalities implies that either realism or Einstein
locality should be abandoned. As we saw in our coun-
terexample which is both Einstein local and realistic in
the common sense of the word, it is the one to one corre-
spondence of the variables to the logical elements of Boole
that matters when we determine a possible experience, but
not necessarily the choice between realism and Einstein lo-
cality. Phrased differently, the question “does the moon
shine when we are not looking” is simply too imprecise.
Had we given a space-time coordinate for the event that
the moon shines we would have expressed an eternal truth
of a measurement.
Realism plays a role in the arguments of Bell and fol-
lowers because they introduce a variable λ representing an
element of reality and then write
Γ = 〈Aa(λ)Ab(λ)〉+ 〈Aa(λ)Ac(λ)〉+ 〈Ab(λ)Ac(λ)〉 ≥ −1.
(8)
Because no λ exists that would lead to a violation except
a λ that depends on the index pairs (a, b), (a, c) and
(b, c) the simplistic conclusion is that either elements of
reality do not exist or they are non-local. The mistake
here is that Bell and followers insist from the start that
the same element of reality occurs for the three differ-
ent experiments with three different setting pairs. This
assumption implies the existence of the combinatorial-
topological cyclicity that in turn implies the validity of
a non-trivial inequality but has no physical basis. Why
should the elements of reality not all be different? Why
should they, for example not include the time of measure-
ment? There is furthermore no reason why there should be
no parameter of the equipment involved. Thus the equip-
ment could involve time and setting dependent parameters
such as λa(t), λb(t), λc(t) and the functions A might de-
pend on these parameters as well. We refer the reader
to the references [6, 17–20] and note that parameters re-
lated to the devices of measurement have been discussed
already by Wigner [21] but not in connection to the one-
to-one correspondence with Boole’s logical elements. The
possible dependence of these parameters on measurement
time or Einstein’s space-time prevents the derivation of the
Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality because outcome
independence may be violated, as can be seen directly by
using our example of different outcomes for even and odd
times in their equations.
Bell revisited from the view of quantum theory.
– Consider three spin 1/2 particles that are measured
by macroscopic equipment involving three Stern-Gerlach
magnets. The wave function of the three particles is not
nearer specified and denoted by ψ3. If we denote the
measurement outcomes at measurement time n for the
three particles with the three respective magnet settings
by An
a
(ψ3), A
n
b
(ψ3), A
n
c
(ψ3), then it is easy to show by
the laws of quantum theory that the Boole (Bell) inequal-
ity [22]:
〈Ana(ψ3)A
n
b(ψ3)〉 + 〈A
n
a(ψ3)A
n
c (ψ3)〉
+ 〈An
b
(ψ3)A
n
c
(ψ3)〉 ≥ −1, (9)
is fulfilled and we can conclude that we have dealt with the
logical elements of Boole and well defined probabilities.
If we consider instead six measurements of pairs
of particles that are described by the singlet state
ψS then we need three different measurement station
pairs or one pair of measurement-stations at three
different measurement times. For simplicity consider
three different measurement-station pairs that we la-
bel with indices n,m, l. Correspondingly we also
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introduce for the measurement outcomes the sym-
bols An
a
(ψS), A
n
b
(ψS);A
m
a
(ψS), A
m
c
(ψS);A
l
b
(ψS), A
l
c
(ψS).
Then quantum theory tells us that for certain magnet set-
tings we may have:
〈Ana(ψS)A
n
b(ψS)〉 + 〈A
m
a (ψS)A
m
c (ψS)〉
+ 〈Al
b
(ψS)A
l
c
(ψS)〉 < −1, (10)
and we have a violation of an inequality that resembles the
Bell- type. In this case, however, this does not surprise us
because as long as we have no cyclicity in the expressions
of Eq. (10), we obtain only a trivial Boole inequality and as
far as Boole’s or Kolmogorov’s probability are concerned
the right hand side of Eq. (10) might as well be −3. Note
that the attachment of space-time indices to the variables
that provide a characterization of the experiments in ad-
dition to observations such as the magnet settings always
permit a removal of any cyclicity. Quantum theory does
not have any concerns about the indices n,m, l because
quantum theory is careful not to assign any meaning to
the single outcomes and therefore does not rely on or need
a sample space or probability space.
A probability as in the frameworks of Boole or Kol-
mogorov is thus not defined in quantum theory because
quantum theory does not define any relations of its frame-
work to single logical elements or elementary events and
therefore also can not provide a measure to general sets
or subsets of such elements or events. What is defined in
quantum theory are long term averages and these may be
related in a variety of ways to the actual logical elements
of a theory. The probability amplitude just carries with
it all the possibilities that may actually be realized in a
set of data, that is all the possibilities that may be re-
alized as a sample space. For an actual sample space to
be realized other choices must be made that, in principle,
have nothing to do with the quantum particles that are
measured but only with the macroscopic equipment that
is brought into a certain setting for the purpose of mea-
surement. These other choices may again involve sample
spaces and probability spaces that together with the mea-
surement outcomes related to quantum particles may form
complex stochastic processes.
Quantum theory predicts the long term averages of
these stochastic processes but does not attempt to unify
these processes into one common stochastic process. The
Born rule thus attaches positive values to measurement
outcomes that are related to certain measurements and
preparations and defines in this way what one could call a
pre-measure. For all well defined macroscopic equipment
arrangements this pre-measure can be turned into a prob-
ability measure with different experimental sequences cor-
responding, in principle, to different probability measures.
Whether or not these different measures and sample spaces
can be unified is a matter of characterization. If no uni-
fication is possible, as would be indicated by a violation
of a Boole (Bell) inequality, then one needs further de-
tail in the characterization of variables in order to remove
the cyclicity. That may be achieved both in an Einstein
local way or in a non-local fashion. As we saw above,
EPR experiments always permit extended characteriza-
tion by Einstein’s space-time and corresponding avoidance
of cyclicity. Nonlocal characterizations that avoid cyclicity
are also always possible but not necessary. The only al-
ternative to the above is to abandon realism (whatever we
mean by this word) altogether. The examples (counterex-
amples) with the patient-investigations and the relation of
these examples to EPR experiments prove, at least in the
opinion of these authors, that neither realism nor Einstein
locality need be abandoned because of a violation of Bell’s
inequalities.
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